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Abstract: The problem of personal identity is a classical 
problem in philosophy. This question has been variedly 
tackled by different philosophers and philosophical 
schools. To address the problem of personal identity, it is 
essential to explicate the notion of ‘person.' Many phi-
losophers conceive persons as inherently conscious be-
ings, who are capable of intentional mental activities 
which are explicable from the ability to have the first-
person perspective and imagine the same of the other. On 
the other hand, physicalistic personhood is something that 
has mechanical/bodily properties but, either lacking con-
sciousness or reducing it to a physical basis. For many 
others, persons have both the properties of mind and 
body, not reduciable to each other. We would agree par-
tially with the latter position and maintain that persons 
have not only physical properties but also various forms 
of consciousness, i.e., self-consciousness, moral con-
sciousness, etc. The ability to take perspectives, we claim, 
lays the foundation of moral consciousness. In this paper, 
we aim to show that the idea of personal identity is very 
much related to moral consciousness. This is because per-
sons are rational beings, and being rational is natural to 
the person. If a person does any irrational act, it almost 
becomes self-denial to him or her as rationality is natural 
to her or him. Therefore, rationality is one of the inborn 
qualities of human being, and thus her or his identity be-
comes a moral identity. If we accept persons as physical 
beings ultimately, the question of morality, freedom, and 
responsibility do not arise. The whole idea of self-
determination is occurred only in the case of moral iden-
tity, but not in the case of persons as only physical beings. 
Therefore, personal identity and moral identity are con-
ceptually connected to the extent that we propose that 
personal identity is moral identity. 
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The Problem of Personal Identity 
 
Before analyzing the concept of person, we need to raise a 
few questions like what is a person, what is the nature of 
the person, and so on. These are fundamental questions in 
the philosophy of mind. The English word ‘person' is al-
leged to have been derived from the Latin 'persona,' 
which was the mask worn by actors in dramatic perform-
ances.1 Neither in common usage nor in philosophy has 
there been a univocal concept of ‘person.' In common 
usage ‘person' refers to any human being in a general 
way. The person is distinct from a thing or material ob-
ject. It stands for a living, conscious human being.  
 Let us take two philosophers - P. F. Strawson and 
Bernard Williams as a paradigm of contrasting concep-
tualization of the philosophical notion of person: Straw-
son defines ‘person' as "a type of entity such that both 
predicates ascribing states of consciousness and predi-
cates ascribing corporeal characteristics, a physical situa-
tion &c. are equally applicable to a single individual of 
that single type.”2 For Strawson, persons are unique indi-
viduals who have both mental and physical attributes. 
Thus persons are neither purely physical body, nor are 
they pure spiritual substances. However, the Strawsonian 
view of persons is also non-material, whereas Williams’ 
view of the person is purely material, which is in contrast 
with the Strawsonian view. This is because of William's3 
claim is that bodily continuity is a necessary condition for 
personal identity, because according to Williams, it is the 
body which identifies the persons, but not the mind, and 
there is no mind at all; therefore, bodily criterion identi-
fies the persons. Therefore, the category ‘persons’ be-
longs to spatiotemporal beings. Similarly, according to 
Parfit, a person is a psychological continuous living hu-
man body.4 Because physical continuity is neither neces-
sary nor sufficient for personal identity. It is insufficient 
because a human being could conceivably change so radi-
cally that s(he) would not be the same person. A great 
deal of what matters to us in ourselves and others is psy-
chological: our memories, characters, tastes, interests, 
loves, and so forth.5 This spatiotemporal being is the on-
tological individuality of a person. Thus persons are onto-
logically a natural kind. Now we can say that they are 
natural beings at one level and are self-conscious and 
minded being at another. The self-conscious includes the 
self-description of his or her awareness that s(he) is a 
solid, continuing being in the world and this spatiotempo-
ral description itself recognized persons are natural 
minded being.6 
Now the question is, does Strawson wish to say that 
persons are bodies of a particular sort, namely, bodies 
which have mental attributes as only? Strawson holds that 
persons have bodily attributes too. But unlike ordinary 
bodies, persons are things, which have mental attributes 
as well. According to Strawson,7 it is essential to persons 
that they be entities, which necessarily have both mental 
and bodily attributes. Also, those mental things are sub-
stantially different from physical things? They are differ-
ent types of substance. Persons are radically different ma-
terial bodies. Strawson's theory appears to be dualistic - in 
holding that there are two different types of subjects, the 
physical bodies, and persons. 
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Again, physical bodies necessarily have only one dimen-
sion, that is, physical dimension. Then, there is perhaps 
no error in holding that (as concurred by many artificial 
intelligence theories) persons are mechanical beings,8 but 
this seems to be experientially counter-intuitive for per-
sons necessarily have two dimensions, a physical and a 
mental dimension. Persons thus have a dual nature. The 
most important fact about the person is the self. The self 
is sometimes used to mean the whole series of a person's 
inner mental states and sometimes the spiritual substance 
to which they belong. The self does not refer to the body 
but the mental history of the person. This made the unity 
problem seem intractable, when the mental images, feel-
ings, and the like, are contrasted with the temporal persis-
tence. In Strawson’s sense, a person is a thing which ne-
cessarily has both mental and physical aspects. The per-
son is primarily the subject of mental experience. In the 
Strawsonian person theory, we cannot say that a person is 
a body, but we can say that a person is, in part, a body. If 
the person is a body, then it cannot be a conscious mind, 
and therefore, there is nothing wrong attributing mind to 
machines. One of the important questions is can we even 
say that a person has a body? But what would it mean for 
the theory of person? It means that persons have bodily 
attributes. Another question is, does it say anything about 
the relation between a person and a body? The body ne-
cessarily has bodily attributes and has nothing to do with 
a person's attributes. But Strawson’s view is that persons 
have both bodily and mental attributes. According to 
Strawson,9 properties like ‘being at such and such time 
and place,' having such and such weight and colour, and 
so on are M-predicates. The other properties are psy-
chological properties like ‘being in the state of happiness,' 
or ‘being in the state of pain,' and so on are states of P-
predicates. In this way, Strawson has rightly said, "the 
concept of a person is to be understood as the concept of a 
type of entity such that both predicates ascribing corpo-
real characteristics, a physical situation and consciousness 
are equally applicable to an individual entity of that 
type."10 What is significant about them, as Strawson has 
pointed out is their co-applicability to the same person 
substance. The M-predicates cannot be ascribable inde-
pendently because of that prohibits them from being as-
cribable to the conscious beings, like M-predicates, the P-
predicates cannot be ascribed to the material bodies. This 
is because of a combination of a distinct kind of substance 
that has both physical and mental properties without be-
ing reducible to each other.  
The above argument shows that Strawson was accept-
ing the person as non-material and non-dual yet incorpo-
rating the explanatory powers of Cartesian dualism. This 
is because Descartes held that when we dwell on the con-
cept of person, we are referring to one or both of two dis-
tinct substances of different types, each of which has its 
appropriate types of states and properties. Each of which 
has its own appropriate types of states and properties and 
none of the states belong to both. That is to say that states 
of consciousness belong to one of these substances and 
the other. Descartes has given a sharp focus to this 
dualistic conception of the person. It is not easy to get 
away from dualism because persons have both sorts of 
attributes such as mental and physical. According to 
dualistic conception, a person is something altogether dis-
tinct from the body. That is, a person is not identical to 
his body. Some dualists, however, believe that a person is 
a composite entity, one part of which is its body and an-
other, part of which is something-immaterial spirit or 
soul. Thus dualism essentially adheres to the mind-body 
distinction and persons as mental beings as distinguished 
from material bodies. 
Joseph Margolis11 in his book ‘Persons and Minds' 
mentioned that persons are the particulars that have minds 
and nervous systems, sensation, and brain processes. But 
this will not quite do. A nervous system is not a person, 
nor is a psyche a person. It is at once the subject of both 
neurological and psychological predicates. In other 
words, it is both a nervous system and a psychic entity. 
Persons are not mereologically complex entities nor kind, 
each of which contains parts, a non-physical basic subject 
and a purely corporeal object to which this subject is in 
some way attached; for such a claim would not allow us 
to ascribe psychological attributes or corporeal attributes 
to the person as a whole. It is because persons are more 
than their bodies and that they are not reducible to any 
kind of body gross or subtle. The person-substance as de-
scribed above is not taken to exclude the material proper-
ties as such. They only exclude the fact that persons are 
material bodies and nothing else. Persons are autonomous 
so far as their description in terms of bodies and mind is 
concerned. But it is not that no reference to body and 
mind is to be retained at all. Thus, person's description 
has the attributes reference to body and mind. Therefore, 
one of the paradoxical implications of the person theory is 
that the body which a person has cannot be conceived of 
as a physical object subject to the law of the physical 
world as we know from this theory, that persons are con-
scious. Finally, from the above examination, we may infer 
that a person's body is not a physical thing. 
 
 
Person as Self-Conscious and Ontological Being 
  
As we have argued so far, the person is an entity which 
has both mental and physical attributes. Hence, we could 
say of a person that s(he) is five feet tall, weighs a hun-
dred kilograms, etc. But more importantly we could say 
that s(he) is thinking about his friends, feels a pang of 
guilt or is happy, or so on. We may, therefore, say that a 
person has a mind, which is different from his body be-
cause the subject of consciousness does not mean a body 
of a certain sort. But it still might turn out that whatever is 
a subject of consciousness is identical with a body of a 
certain sort. 
Generally, consciousness is described as something, 
which distinguishes man from a good deal of the world 
around. Only a person possesses this consciousness, 
which is not by other material objects. Again, the question 
arises, what is this consciousness which a person certainly 
has, but rocks and other animate beings do not have? As 
G.E. Moore writes, “The moment we try to fix our atten-
tion upon consciousness and to see what distinctly it is, it 
seems to vanish: it seems as if we had before us as mere 
emptiness when we try to introspect the sensation of blue, 
all we can see is the blue; the other element is as if it were 
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diaphanous.”12 Of course, we know perfectly well that we 
are conscious of things around us including other people, 
but we do not grasp consciousness itself. 
 However, it is this common feature, consciousness, 
which may be said to be the central element in the con-
cept of mind. A person as being minded13 is to have the 
capacity of doing mental activities. Such activities include 
thinking, willing, feeling, understanding, speaking, com-
municating, and above all, remembering the past. Mental 
activities are such that they presuppose that there is a 
thinker who is capable of these activities. The thinker is 
here a subject or ‘I' who is or has the capacity of con-
sciousness. Wherever we will find the concept of ‘I,' we 
will find the existence of consciousness because it is a 
person who stands for the concept of ‘I,' have conscious-
ness. 
One of the most general views is that the philosophy 
of mind is concerned with all mental phenomena which 
they are concerned with consciousness. Philosophers from 
Descartes onwards have accepted consciousness as a 
fundamental metaphysical reality. I remain the same per-
son if I am conscious of being so, even though my body 
should change drastically and be diminished through am-
putation. Conceptually, it is possible that I should remain 
the same person although I am altogether disembodied. 
Persons are indivisible, non-corporeal simple entities. It is 
because it becomes difficult here to distinguish persons so 
construed from metaphysical selves, transcendental egos, 
spirits, mental substances, souls, and other similar imma-
terial substances. However, the concept of a person does 
not fit into these entities, because persons are, if anything, 
concrete beings in the world. One can ascribe conscious-
ness to others only if one can identify other subjects of 
experience. Also, one cannot identify other subjects if one 
can identify them only as subjects of experience, posses-
sors of state of consciousness.14 The latter must have a 
concrete existence in the world. 
If we are too obsessed with the ‘inner' criteria, we 
shall be tempted to treat persons essentially as minds. We 
do need to factor in the widely and empirically substanti-
ated claims (from psychology, neurosciences, medical 
sciences) that the bodily constituency also affects the 
mental characters and the domains of mind and body are 
not disjointed. However, admitting outer criteria does not 
mean that there are no states of consciousness. We should 
claim that some P-predicates refer to the occurrence of a 
state of consciousness. Persons are certainly identifiable 
beings having a life of their own. They are not Cartesian 
egos; rather they possess a mixed bag of M-predicates and 
P-predicates. Persons are in any case conscious individu-
als who can be ascribed a large number of P-predicates 
such as thinking, feeling, willing, deciding, etc. these con-
scious states, according to Searle,15 are intentional, that is, 
are of something. That is, they are directed at something 
outside them. Thus, persons who have these conscious 
states are intentional and mental beings. 
Again, only a being that could have conscious, inten-
tional states could have intentionality at all, and so every 
unconscious intentional state is at least potentially con-
scious. This thesis has an enormous consequence for the 
study of the mind. But there is a conceptual connection 
between consciousness and intentionality that has the 
consequence that a complete theory of intentionality re-
quires an account of consciousness. And our conscious-
ness is consciousness of something. Thus persons have 
the essential feature of consciousness. There is an inter-
connection between person, mind, and consciousness. 
Empirically, there are distinctions between them. But 
transcendentally, they point in the same direction. It is 
right to say that a person is a mental being, and the es-
sence of mind is consciousness. Therefore, the concept of 
the mind, the person, and the consciousness go together. 
Thus consciousness is related to mind, which also belongs 
to a person. 
P.F. Strawson has adopted the term ‘person’ for a 
philosophical use which comes rather closer to common 
usage than did Locke’s usage of the form, while it raises 
philosophical problems of its own perhaps it is less dis-
reputable to hold that the person is a primitive concept. 
This is because the Lockean view of the concept of per-
son is forensic concept, but Strawsonian concept of per-
son is a metaphysical concept like the concept of the self 
and therefore is not merely a social or a forensic con-
cept.16 Pradhan17 points out that it is metaphysical, pre-
cisely because it shows how it can be used to describe the 
minded being as the unique substance which is not identi-
cal with the body, though it is necessarily linked with the 
body. That is to say that persons have material bodies and 
yet are not on the same levels as physical bodies or organ-
isms. Persons, therefore, are not physical things at all and 
this is because persons transcend their physical existence. 
The person-substance as a minded being tended to be the 
‘I' or the self in the sense that, though it is a continuant 
being in the spatiotemporal world, yet it does not belong 
to the world in the way the human belongs. It is because 
human beings belong to this world, but the ‘I' or the self 
is not an entity in the world at all. The fact is that the self 
is not a physical body to be counted in the world. Hence 
there is a sense of transcendence underlying the concept 
of self, though it does not mean that selves or persons for 
that matter are mysterious entities. 
The transcendental qualities, however, shows that per-
sons are explainable from the first-person perspective. 
The first-person perspective grants a unique individuality 
or an ‘I’ who experiences, as Wittgenstein18 points out 
that even it is not ‘name' which can substitute ‘I.' There-
fore, the first-person is not the descriptions of any human 
being, because it refers to the third-person perspective, 
but it refers to the person himself or herself. This does not 
mean that person is distinct from this world, but a person 
is part of this world. As a Strawsonian person, to begin 
with, is to be understood as distinct from a mere material 
body, which retains the contrast customarily observed be-
tween a person and things.  
Let us now think of some ways in which we ordinarily 
talk of ourselves, certain things which we do, and which 
are ordinarily ascribed to ourselves. We ascribe to our-
selves actions, intentions, sensations, thoughts, feelings, 
perceptions and memories. However, we ascribe to our-
selves location and attitude. Of course, not only we as-
cribe ourselves temporary conditions, states, situations, 
but also enduring characteristics, including physical char-
acteristics like height, shape, and weight. That is to say, 
those among the things that we ascribe to ourselves are 
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those that we also ascribe to material bodies. But there are 
things and attributes that we ascribe to ourselves, but can-
not dream of ascribing to material bodies. 
Moreover, the persons are human beings and have the 
history of an organism belonging to a natural kind. At the 
same time, they are not physical beings at all, and they 
transcend their physical existence, i.e., self-conscious mo-
ral being. This transcendental nature of a person cannot 
be merely only a social construction. Thus persons are 
metaphysical beings who could be all these and yet must 
be claimed in the sense that they could not be what they 
are without a metaphysical essence.  
 
 
Personal Identity as Moral Identity 
 
In this section, we aim to show that personal identity as 
moral identity. Many scholars like Kant, who claim that 
the fundamental idea of philosophy is human autonomy. 
According to Kant, ‘autonomy' literally means giving the 
law to oneself.19 Kant's moral philosophy is also based on 
the idea of autonomy. He holds that there is a single 
fundamental principle of morality, on which all specific 
moral duties are based. He calls this moral law the cate-
gorical imperative. The moral law is a product of reason, 
for Kant, while the basic laws of nature are products of 
our understanding. Moral rightness and wrongness apply 
only to free agents who control their actions and have it in 
their power, at the time of their actions, either to act 
rightly or not.20 Thus freedom depends on our moral iden-
tity and humans have complete liberty to practice mo-
rality. Because a person claims that ‘I should do justice’ 
or ‘All men are equal’ or ‘I am an honest person' or ‘I am 
a good human21 Thus it is a morality that leads to free-
dom, and it is a problem of human to claim that freedom 
is necessary being a moral agent. The freedom is not 
something given; rather it is something achieved. This is 
because a person is potentially free, but certain obstacles 
that s(he) has ignorantly put around herself or himself ap-
pear to limit her or his freedom. But Rajendra Prasad 
pointed out that for some philosophical systems, freedom 
is only instrumental good, that is, it is good because it is 
helpful to, is a necessary condition for, to achieve some-
thing higher; for some other systems, it is intrinsically 
good, that is, a state desirable for its own sake. There are 
also many systems which consider both instrumentally 
and intrinsically good. Lastly, many believe that freedom 
is a state of mind and not of the body.22  
Let us look at the idea of moral identity. If persons are 
not moral, they are not persons. This is because persons 
are rational beings, and being rational is natural to the 
person. If a person does any irrational act, it becomes 
self-denial to her or him as rationality is natural. The mo-
ral identity modified into self-identity.23 Therefore, ra-
tionality is one of the in born qualities of human being 
and thus his or her identity became a moral identity. If we 
accept persons are material beings, the question of mo-
rality and freedom do not arise. There is an idea of self 
determination is exist in the case of moral identity, but not 
in the case of persons are material identities. Therefore, 
personal identity as moral identity is because being a per-
son is self-conscious and ontological being.  
However, the claim is that to be moral is natural for a per-
son as it is for her/him to be rational. Humans are natu-
rally moral beings in the sense that every human person 
has the natural propensity to act morally unless otherwise 
constrained.24 In this way, a person's moral nature follows 
jointly from her/his being rational as well as spiritual. It is 
spiritual because person urge rises above self-interest and 
ego-centricity and are motivated to act morally from the 
universal point of view. The view that rational dis-
cernment of the moral form the immortal and spiritual 
urge for self-excelling put us naturally on the path of mo-
ral progress. Hence, the moral inclination is innate to per-
sons, who are constitutively endowed with the capacity of 
rationality and spirituality. This is because moral person-
hood is constitutive in nature.  
The person as the ideal moral agent makes choices 
which are rationally guided but are not the result of a de-
liberative of a process undertaken by an abstract moral 
reason. These choices flow from the internal moral com-
mitments of the person. The moral commitments are the 
commitments of the normative kind which are located in 
the moral nature of the person concerned.25 We would 
like to reiterate that it is futile to ask for the justification 
for persons being rational. This shows not that rationality 
lacks a necessary justification but that it needs no justifi-
cation because it cannot intelligibly be questioned unless 
it is already presupposed. It is not the case that men are 
rational because of the circumstances, but a person's ra-
tional identities are beyond any kind of conditions. The 
natural fact that persons are capable, by rationality, not 
only of theoretic discriminations of sorts but also of judg-
ing what we should do and should not do. This is because 
a person is a self-knowing agent in the sense that s(he) is 
aware of his or her moral commitments as a person hav-
ing willingly made rational choices. Following Pradhan, 
we would like to point out that self-knowledge in this 
sense is not merely knowing what one does, but willing to 
undertake to do certain actions. The self-knowing person 
is a willing and performing person. Self-willing is as im-
portant as self-knowing. Therefore, self-knowledge is a 
part of the moral personhood. 
Self-knowledge is very much related to the idea of the 
person being rational is evaluative consciousness, which 
is characteristic of personal consciousness. This is be-
cause of the moral reflection on a person's actions. Moral 
reflection, by which we engage in the moral evaluation of 
ourselves, our actions and those of others, is thus constitu-
tive of personhood; for moral reflection is the activity of 
rational agents and only persons are rational agents. The 
relation of ‘constitution' is crucial to explain the notion of 
person and personal identity. The Constitution is a widely 
occurring relation in the world around us. What needs to 
be clarified first is that constitution is neither a relation of 
identity nor a relation of separateness. 
However, the constitutive nature of personhood is 
very much related to the reflective nature of moral action. 
The objects of one's moral action may be a reflection of 
one's own intention, actions as well as those of others and 
such reflections are usually expressed in the form of mo-
ral judgments. 
However, the moral judgments lead to a person commit-
ting to those beliefs and desires in the sense that these in-
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tentional states play a constitutive role in the unfolding of 
plans and projects of the person. The person is so-called 
because of the plans and projects which s(he) intends to 
execute. For this kind of execution, the person needs to 
have rational choices. This is one of the important aspects 
of being moral personhood. Again, this fact is very much 
related to the notion of ‘freedom' and freedom is the basis 
of rational choice. If the person had not a rational nature, 
s(he) could not have exercised freedom because freedom 
is the very essence of rationality and morality.26 On the 
other hand, the idea of freedom is sometimes formulated 
independently values, preferences, and reasons. There-
fore, freedom cannot be fully appraised without some idea 
of what a person prefers and has reason to prefer. Here, 
there is a basic use of rational assessment in appraising 
freedom. In this sense, freedom must depend on a rea-
soned assessment of having different options. As Amartya 
Sen says, "Rationality as the use of reasoned scrutiny 
cannot but be central to the idea and assessment of free-
dom."27 If we take freedom otherwise, rationality depends 
on freedom. To practice a rational choice in civil society, 
freedom is necessary. But if we see freedom as a person's 
natural right, freedom is necessary for her or his exist-
ence. If one views rationality or morality from a Kantian 
perspective, it is a person's primary duty to be moral as 
being only a rational animal in the universe. Our aim in 
this paper is not to discuss the philosophical problems ex-
ist about person's external world, rather analyze person's 
natural nature, as we have been arguing is an inherent fea-
ture of personal identity, which is morality or rationality. 
We do not deny that freedom can be valued for the sub-
stantive opportunity it gives to the pursuit of our objec-
tives and goals.  
Moreover, while responding to one of the important 
questions like "why should I be rational?" The first an-
swer would be: it is up to the person. Here, the idea of 
freedom inherently present in a person's existence. As Ra-
jendra Prasad said, that person should be moral because 
being moral has an intrinsic dignity of its own or that it is 
a necessary condition for having personal happiness, 
social harmony, etc.28 Our answer would be rational is 
part of the definition of being a person. There may be 
several non-ethical points of view from which we may 
demand reasons for action, for example, self-interest. 
From impartial spectator, it may be the reason for trans-
cending self-interest and act on universal judgments. This 
transcendental nature of a person leads to spirituality. 
This is because moral judgment is possible through spiri-
tual endeavors. This leads to the fact that there is an in-
nate potentiality which when actualized or realized, leads 
the person to rise above his self-interest. This spirituality 
has an innate capacity, which is the realization through 
intellectual maturity. This intellectual maturity is under 
the spirituality that the person is a self-reflective and self-
evaluator. Therefore, there is a spiritual urge for self-
transcendence underlies a person's life of self-appraisal 
that leads to self-transcendence. The self-transcendence 
requires that the person's motivational system be con-
trolled by his valuation system with which he identifies 
his or her reason and has to control his or her passion.  
In the above passage, the concept of freedom plays a vital 
role. It is because a person's commitments and choices are 
based on a person's freedom. Freedom as a social value is 
the power to choose between real alternatives and to real-
ize the chosen alternative to further one's own, someone 
else's or some group's interests. By calling it power, we 
want to emphasize the fact that it is not a state or occur-
rence but ability. It is not a state of mind, nor something 
that occurs to it, but a power or ability to work in a certain 
manner. This power may or may not be exercised on a 
certain occasion, but this does not mean that on that occa-
sion it has ceased to exist. But whatever it is exercised, in 
a conscious manner. It is a conscious power because it is 
a power to choose, and choice, by its very definition, in-
volves conscious selection and rejection. It is contradic-
tory to claim ‘I chose x in the context c out of x, y, z, but 
was not aware of my choice29 This is why many philoso-
phers argue that it is a natural propensity of a person to 
act morally and in the same manner to become a moral 
person one depends on his or her freedom. Freedom of the 
individual, which is the driving force of self-excellence, is 
the prerogative of persons. It lies at the root of the urge to 
moral perfectibility and goes to the making of what we 
have been referring to as unfailing moral personhood. It is 
because persons always seek freedom and s(he) is en-
gaged in reflective self-evaluation, and such is an em-
bodiment of value. Freedom is important because, on 
Kant's view, moral appraisal presupposes that we are free 
in the sense that we can do otherwise. Freedom is not 
supposed as a character or quality; rather it is the very es-
sence of the person. Any qualities or characters are some-
thing different from that to which it belongs, but freedom 
does not belong to the person, the person is freedom. Al-
though there are various determining factors that exist in 
the universe, this does not mean freedom is not there in 
the universe. Therefore, freedom does not mean ‘no-
determination,' it means self determination.  
We would like to point out that person's ability to be 
free, the ability to identify herself/ himself with the value 
judgment and in this way the person transcends the level 
of mere human existence, but the person never identifies 
with this material world. This does not mean that a person 
does not interact with this material world. Rather, the per-
son attains rationality through the human body (material 
world).30 A person alone attains perfection, but not any 
other beings in this world. This is how moral progress is 
possible. This progress is possible by moral striving, and 
moral striving that aims at moral perfection is not just ra-
tional but spiritual. Thus a person can exercise the spiri-
tual self- transcendence, as well as the freedom that leads 
to perfections. Therefore, perfection is a matter of natural 
necessity as we have seen that morality is a rational affair 
and since rationality is constitutive of personhood, mo-
rality becomes intrinsic to personhood. That is why we do 
not find any difficulty to combine both spirituality and 
rationality to establish personal identity. 
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